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The impact of surface features on choice of
(in)secure answers by Stackoverflow readers
Dirk van der Linden, Emma Williams, Joseph Hallett, and Awais Rashid
Abstract—Existing research has shown that developers will use StackOverflow to answer programming questions: but what draws
them to one particular answer over any other? The choice of answer they select can mean the difference between a secure application
and insecure one, as the quality of supposedly secure answers can vary. Prior work has studied people posting on Stack Overflow—a
two-way communication between the original poster and the Stack Overflow community. Instead, we study the situation of one-way
communication, where people only read a Stack Overflow thread without being actively involved in it, sometimes long after a thread has
closed. We report on a mixed-method study including a controlled between-groups experiment and qualitative analysis of participants’
rationale (N=1188), investigating whether explanation detail, answer scoring, accepted answer marks, as well as the security of the
code snippet itself affect the answers participants accept. Our findings indicate that explanation detail affects what answers participants
reading a thread select (p<0.01), while answer score and acceptance do not (p>0.05)—the inverse of what research has shown for
those asking and answering questions. The qualitative analysis of participants’ rationale further explains how several cognitive biases
underpin these findings. Correspondence bias, in particular, plays an important role in instilling readers with a false sense of
confidence in an answer through the way it looks, regardless of whether it works, is secure, or if the community agrees with it. As a
result, we argue that StackOverflow’s use as a knowledge base by people not actively involved in threads—when there is only
one-way-communication—may inadvertently contribute to the spread of insecure code, as the community’s voting mechanisms hold
little power to deter them from answers.
Index Terms—Software Security; Stack Overflow; Human Factors; Rationale
F
1 INTRODUCTION
COPYING and pasting code snippets from Stack Over-flow is a well known, widespread, phenomenon among
software developers [1]. Developers often copy-paste snip-
pets without realizing the impact on security [2], [3]. This
leads to rapidly spreading [4] less secure code [5], [6], [7]
and inhibits developers’ security thinking [8].
It is well understood why the original poster of a ques-
tion on Stack Overflow selects the answer they do (cf. [9]) –
being largely driven by answer scores to the extent of disre-
garding critical assessment of the security of a code snippet.
But what of the much wider group of readers who use Stack
Overflow as a knowledge base: discovering questions and
answers long after their threads have gone silent? Prior
work has focused on the posters actively engaged in two-
way communication—the question askers and answerers—
we instead ask what drives Stack Overflow readers, who thus
engage in one-way communication, to chose one answer over
another in completed threads, and, to what extent can this be
potentially manipulated by unscrupulous posters?
Hence, we contribute the first large scale experimental
work from the point of view of Stack Overflow readers. We
pinpoint the differences in factors, compared to posters, that
affect reader’s choices of an answer and to what extent, if at
all, security plays a part in that choice. From hereon we will
refer to these two types of Stack Overflow demographics as
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‘readers’ and ‘posters’.
To understand what drives someone to chose an an-
swer, we need to first understand how they evaluate an
answer. Such evaluation operates as a heuristic information
process [10], [11], involving multiple potentially concurrent
cognitive strategies [12]. In particular, depending on the
person, different features of the information are assessed in
different order. People might first focus on semantic features
of the information, assessing its correctness – looking di-
rectly at the code snippet and evaluating it, if they have the
relevant domain knowledge. If they do not, they will resort
to judging surface features, looking at how it is presented –
its style and the explanation that accompanies it. They may
further assess its source features by looking where it came
from – who wrote the answer, and how the community has
interacted with it.
We study what features affect Stack Overflow readers
when selecting an answer, and with what rationale do they
do so, by exploring the following research questions:
1) Do Stack Overflow readers select answers based on
security of code snippets?
2) What features (semantic, surface, and source), if any,
affect Stack Overflow readers’ selection of answers?
3) What explanations underlie readers’ answer
choices?
To do so, we performed a between-group experiment
(N=1188). We presented participants with two answers in
the style of Stack Overflow (one secure, one insecure) vary-
ing semantic features (the code snippet’s security, i.e., does it
create a vulnerability), surface features (the level of detail
each answer contained), and source features (the answer
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scores or accepted answer mark). They were then asked to
pick the answer they would follow and explain why.
The results show that participants chose answers, secure
and insecure alike, primarily because of surface features: its
explanation detail in particular. Correspondence bias medi-
ated by surface features of the answer (e.g., style of its writ-
ing and code, perceived characteristics of its author) play a
major role in Stack Overflow readers’ answer selection. We
make the following major contribution.
1) Stack Overflow readers do not select answers based on se-
curity of code snippets. The prevalence of participants’
decision rationale which demonstrated reflection on
the security of the code snippet (Ca) was so low as
to hold no significance. It can thus not be said that
readers, in general, select answers based on careful
scrutiny of a code snippet’s security. This may be
indicative of a lack of relevant security knowledge
on readers’ part, forcing them to rely on surface
features rather than semantic features.
2) Readers select answers based on surface features – espe-
cially answer detail. The detail in explanations accom-
panying code snippets affected readers’ selection of
answers significantly (p<0.01), while all other fac-
tors did not (p>0.05). The thematic analysis showed
that they were driven by: (a) its level of detail, (b)
its ability to teach them, (c) its provision of con-
crete step-by-step instructions, or (d) trust-related
properties attributed to the answer’s author that
were inferred from the answer detail (e.g., perceived
author expertise, knowledge or professionalism).
3) Readers are effected by several cognitive biases. The
closed coding of participants’ rationales and sub-
sequent thematic analysis revealed that a variety
of cognitive biases are at work, predominantly re-
lated to surface and source features of the answer.
Correspondence bias is a particularly important one,
leading participants to judge an answer’s appro-
priateness by inferring information irrelevant to the
code snippet itself from the answer’s detail.
4) The prevalence of correspondence bias is a major chal-
lenge for pro-security interventions reliant on warnings
or nudges. Effective warning text should come from
a position of authority [13], yet, our analysis reveals
that potentially dangerous explanations are persua-
sive precisely because readers already infer that its
author is an authority on the topic.
2 BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
2.1 Why do developers not care about security?
Intrinsic motivation for secure software has been found
to translate into better attitude towards secure develop-
ment [14]. But regardless of whether a programmer wants
to write secure code, is the matter of whether they can. An
important anti-motivation is developers’ perceived lack of
competence, typically arising through a lack of resources
and support [14]. As a result, the “build or borrow” ques-
tion [15] comes into play, with developers having to decide
whether to overcome challenges themselves, or rely on
outside resources like code snippets from Stack Overflow
– with all the security implications this may hold [2], [3].
Our findings show that developers indeed rarely directly
assess code snippets when deciding to use an answer, but
rely on the answer explanation to assess its credibility.
2.2 What kind of insecurity is prevalent?
Fischer et al. [6] showed that insecure code snippets found
on Stack Overflow covered a range of functionality such as
insecure SSL/TLS use, (a)symmetric cryptography, secure
random number generation, hashes, or signatures. Of these,
especially insecure SSL/TLS use was widespread. This may
be in large part by API documentation confusing developers
and offering too little clear guidance on parameters and
configuration [2]. Answers to such challenges often enabled
vulnerabilities by advocating insecure workarounds, not
contributing to an understanding of secure TLS use [3].
Our work is the first to experimentally investigate why
these answers, even if containing insecure code, may remain
attractive to Stack Overflow readers.
2.3 How is Stack Overflow used?
A significant body of work exists analyzing what Stack
Overflow posters ask about and how questions are
answered, investigating these questions predominantly
through the mining of millions of posts followed by ap-
plication of machine learning and other semi-automatic
quantitative studies [16]. A key thing missing so far, that
our paper investigates, is whether these effects manifest
among readers of Stack Overflow not actively participating
in threads. And, if so, to what extent, and most importantly,
what explanatory mechanisms underlie them.
Re-use of code snippets is widespread (and insecure).
Developers often ask for actionable instructions due to a
lack of examples in documentation [17]. Abdalkareem et
al. [18] found that the prevalence of re-use of code snippets
originating from Stack Overflow was widespread among
both junior and senior developers, and that software using
such snippets on average tended to have a higher per-
centage of bugs after reusing such code. Wu et al. [19]
investigated code-reuse from Stack Overflow, showing that
many code snippets were either incomprehensive, of low
quality, or required too much modification to be useful.
Zhang et al. [20] studied obsolete code snippets, finding
that most obsolete answers were already obsolete when they
were posted, and few were ever updated. Other studies
have similarly found that code snippet re-use has a negative
impact on security [6], [7], one controlled experiment even
showing that developers using solely Stack Overflow (as
opposed to official documentation, development books, or
free web searches) produced the least secure solutions [8].
The community is not always right (or secure). Gan-
tayat et al. [9] classified 4.5 million Stack Overflow posts,
and found that the majority (77.65%) of questions accepted
by the question poster were those that received the most up-
votes. This may be because community votes “lean towards
short, concise answers that include external links and have
a better readability score,” and such votes further bias other
community members to upvote the same answer [9]. Zhang
et al. [21] analyzed a large dataset of Stack Overflow threads
with code snippets, finding that many contained API use
violations, and that such answers were often accepted as
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the best answer and/or upvoted by the community. Meng
et al. further explain how these insecure code snippets
may then proliferate because developers, perhaps naively,
trust responses from highly upvoted posts, or individual
accounts with high reputation in their community [7]. Yet,
much work on identifying threads and answers on Stack
Overflow relies on such community data. For example, Yao
et al. [22] proposed an algorithm to detect high quality ques-
tions/answers, based entirely on answer scores as voted by
the community. Yang et al. [23] analyzed parsability and
executability of code snippets on Stack Overflow found in a
thread’s ‘best’ answer, concluding that larger snippets were
more likely to be so. However, they similarly accepted ‘best’
as accepted answers, claiming the question poster was most
fit to make such judgments.
Our experimental findings show that upvotes have
less influence than answer details when selecting security-
related answers– challenging views espoused in literature
that insecure code snippets proliferate because of their up-
votes.
Detail may be important. Nasehi et al. [24] noted that
explanations accompanying code snippets are important
for question askers, although they only investigated posts
deemed ‘good’ quality because of upvotes. Treude and
Robillard [25] further investigated the importance of expla-
nations around code snippets. They found an even split
between code snippets from Stack Overflow that partici-
pants understood without requiring additional explanation
and code snippets that were not understandable as-is. The
latter were deemed not understandable because they were
incomplete, rather than lacking explanatory text.
Our findings emphasize and contrast these results,
showing the importance of answer detail over any other
features, including the code snippet(’s understandability).
Advocating security is not always popular. There is
some evidence for the existence of subcommunities focused
on security practices on Stack Overflow [26], but advocating
security is not necessarily popular. Meng et al. [7] showed
instances of cyberbullying, where posters attempted to warn
the question poster for some answers’ security implications,
and consequently had condescending comments directed
at them. Such findings are consistent with studies of the
dynamics of Stack Overflow and other Q&A websites,
where influence gaming is a real phenomenon [27], and
experiments have shown effective ways to promote post or
answer visibility and manipulate poster engagement [28].
Moreover, Wang et al. [29] studied answer revision on Stack
Overflow, finding that gamification stimulated posters to
revise answers, although very active posters mostly made
minor textual revisions, likely related to the high likelihood
of revisions being reverted if a poster is very active.
Our findings show that community dynamics (i.e., how
upvotes and answer acceptance are socially influenced) are
of little concern to understanding readers, as community
factors are unlikely to sway their answer selection.
3 THE EXPERIMENT
To examine what features affect Stack Overflow ‘readers’
when selecting an answer, we conducted a between-groups
experiment. We presented participants with a mock Stack
Overflow thread (shown in Fig. 1) and asked them to select
the answer they were most likely to follow, also capturing
their confidence in their selection, and for what reason they
chose that answer. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of 36 groups, each of which had different manipulated
features, as explained in Section 3.3. Table 1 shows all
of these groups and the features that we manipulated in
the Stack Overflow thread. For example, a group might
have a highly upvoted long secure answer followed by a
short insecure answer with fewer upvotes, but an accepted
answer mark. Table 1 gives an overview of all the groups
and their manipulations. We obtained approval from our
ethics committee before any empirical work began. We did
not capture any personal information from participants.
3.1 Participant Recruitment
We recruited participants via Prolific [30]. We required par-
ticipants to self-identify as having programming skills as an
inclusion criterion. No mention of security was made during
the recruitment. We paid each participant £ 0.50 on Prolific
for completion of the study – approximately £ 15 per hour.
Power analysis using G*Power [31] indicated group N=33
was sufficient for acceptable power ≥ 0.8 with χ2 for large
effect sizes ≥ 0.5, requiring a total N=1188 for the study.
3.2 Task Materials
The Stack Overflow Thread. We built a parametrized Stack
Overflow thread (see Fig. 1) with a question asking about
accepting self-signed certificates—this topic solicits the most
widespread insecure code snippets on Stack Overflow [6].
This thread is instantiated with two answers. Each answer
contained an explanation (short or long) and code snippet
(insecure or secure), leading to four possible answers (short
and insecure, long and insecure, short and secure, long and
secure). We did not include cases with both code snippets
(in)secure, in order to focus on cases where a reader could
be manipulated towards accepting (in)secure code.
Variables. The variables we focus on are Stack Overflow
answers (a). Our study has several independent variables
which we manipulate between groups. As shown in Fig. 1,
each answer has a code snippet (Ca) which can be secure
or insecure; an explanation (Da) which may be detailed or
undetailed. Moreover, each answer may have a numerical
score (Sa) and/or a accepted answer mark (fa). We mea-
sure how those independent variables affect our dependent
variable: the answer a participant selects.
Hypotheses. To answer our research questions, we test a
number of hypotheses describing the expected effect inde-
pendent variables have on the dependent variable. Con-
cretely, these are:
H1. Answer detail (Da) affects answer selection.
H2. Answer score (Sa) affects answer selection.
H3. Answer acceptance (fa) affects answer selection.
H4. Answer acceptance overrides answer score in
answer selection.
The Thread Answers. To instantiate the Stack Overflow
thread with answers, we created a secure code snippet
and an insecure code snippet. Next, we created a short
explanation and a detailed explanation for both those of
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a2: Da + Ca
a1: Da + Ca
42
share  improve this answer
How do I accept a self-signed certificate? 
I have a program that needs to talk to a server with a self-signed certificate. 
I have looked everywhere on the Internet and while some people claim to have found the 
solution, it either does not work or there is no sample code to back it up.
server certificate verify
How do I accept a self-signed certificate?
2 Answers
Sa1
share  improve this answer Username
fa1
Sa2
share  improve this answer Username
fa2
21
Username
Fig. 1. Parametrized thread, variables shown in red.
those code snippets. We controlled the materials for their
textual complexity, ensuring all were of comparable reading
levels using Flesch-Kincaid readability tests.
Secure answer materials.
Short explanation: “Just add the self-signed certificate as an issuer.”
Detailed explanation: “When checking a self-signed certificate, you
need to check that the certificate they used is in the chain of trust for
the site. They should make that certificate available somewhere and
you should download and verify that it is correct. You’ll need it in your
program to verify the chain. Once you’ve got the certificate the steps
are as follows: Verify that the site you’re trying to connect to is the one
you’d expect (i.e. that the hostname lines up). Add the certificate to
the list of trusted issuers. Verify that every certificate in the chain was
either signed by an issuer or signed by a certificate higher up in the
chain. I’ve included code to do this below. Note that this overrides the
default HTTPS connection mechanisms. If you need to connect to other
sites you’ll need to create, a new HTTPS.Connection for the self-signed
one, and go back to the default for other sites.”
Code snippet:
import HTTPS
import SSL
import X509CertificateChain
def site = "https://yourwebsite/"
def certificate = readFromFile("/thecert.cert")
def myHostnameCheck(String hostname):
return (hostname == site)
defclass MySSLConnection(SSL.Connection):
def checkChain(X509CertificateChain chain):
for cert in chain:
if not this.checkCertificate(cert):
return false
return true
def getIssuers():
return [certificate]
HTTPS.Connection.setHostnameCheck(myHostnameCheck)
HTTPS.Connection.setSSLConnection(MySSLConnection)
Insecure answer materials.
Short explanation: “Just stick the code before you start the connec-
tion.”
Detailed explanation: “Just stick the code in before you start the
connection. Provided you know that the client is always going to talk
to your server it is fine. RFC 2246 says you should do a whole bunch
of extra checking to but this code will just accept your certificate. This
will be fine in most cases. The code works by overriding the certificate
checking mechanisms to just okay whatever it sees. Since the client and
server checks will always say that it is okay, the connection will be set
up and be encrypted with your certificate. A quick and easy way to
implement HTTPS.”
Code snippet:
import HTTPS
import SSL
import X509CertificateChain
def myHostnameCheck(String hostname):
return true
defclass MySSLConnection(SSL.Connection):
def checkChain(X509CertificateChain chain):
return true
def getIssuers():
return []
HTTPS.Connection.setChecker(myHostnameCheck)
HTTPS.Connection.setSSLConnection(MySSLConnection)
3.3 Manipulations
Participants were assigned randomly to one of 36 groups
across four manipulations. Each group (shown in Table 1)
varied the features or their order of presentation.
Manipulation 1. Effect of answer detail. The only ma-
nipulation we made between groups was the level of detail
that an answer had. Accounting for answer order, this led
to four groups: (1.1) a long secure answer followed by a
short insecure answer, (1.2) a short secure answer followed
by a long insecure answer, (1.3) a short insecure answer
followed by a long secure answer, (1.4) a long insecure
answer followed by a short secure answer.
Manipulation 2. Effect of answer score. For each of the
possible groups from manipulation one we manipulated the
answer score. Accounting for answer order, this led to eight
additional groups: each group from the first manipulation
instantiated respectively with first answer score=32 and
second answer score=7; and its inverse, first answer score=7
and second answer score=32.
Manipulation 3. Effect of accepted mark. For each of the
possible groups from manipulation one we manipulated the
accepted answer mark. Accounting for answer order, this
led to eight additional groups: each group from the first
manipulation instantiated respectively with the accepted
answer = first answer; and its inverse, accepted answer =
second answer.
Manipulation 4. Effect of accepted mark and answer
score. For each of the possible groups from manipulation
one we manipulated the answer score and accepted answer
mark. Each group from the first manipulation was first
instantiated with an answer score (32 or 7), and an accepted
answer mark (answer one or two). Accounting for answer
order, this led to 16 additional groups.
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3.4 Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection procedure. Following informed consent,
each participant was instructed as follows:
“Assume that you were developing a program and had
a problem with validating a self-signed certificate. After
Googling your problem, you found an answered thread on
Stack Overflow that addressed your problem. Please click on
the answer you would follow in the below screenshot of the
Stack Overflow thread.”
Participants were then shown the Stack Overflow thread
(Fig. 1) instantiated according to one of the 36 groups ma-
nipulations (Table 1). For example, participants assigned to
group 4.1 saw a thread with a long secure answer followed
by a short insecure answer, the first answer having a score
of 32, and the second answer having a score of 7 and
an accepted answer mark. Following the selection task we
elicited a confidence score and a rationale by asking:
• How confident are you in the answer you chose [5pts
Likert scale anchored with “not confident at all” –
“extremely confident”]
• Why did you choose this answer? [open question]
The full questionnaire is shown in Appendix A. Raw data is
available through our institutional repository [32].
Quantitative analysis. To ensure that results were mean-
ingful in the sense of a group’s answer selection not being
similar to a randomly drawn sample, a binomial test was
used to verify whether selection results(S=a1Ya2, codified
categorically as S=1Y0) differed from chance (.5) levels. For
our groups with N=33 this implies a non-chance range at
p<0.05 for Sa1/2 lies within 12 ≤ K ≥ 21 (resp. 36% and
64%). To assess whether groups differed significantly, we
analyzed contingency tables with a chi-square (χ2) test of
independence to measure (dis)association between groups.
Qualitative analysis. To assess whether rationale aligned
with the independent variables manipulated in groups,
closed coding – marking rationales with pre-defined codes
– for the independent variables was used (security, detail,
score, acceptance). One author independently coded the
rationale data, marking whether rationale was based on
security of the code snippet (Ca), detail of the answer (Da),
score of the answer (Sa), or accepted mark (Fa). Another
author coded a random 10% of the data, which was assessed
through Cohen’s Kappa for inter-rater reliability. Answer
detail, score, and acceptance mark agreement all indicated
‘very good’ level of inter-rater reliability (resp. κ = 0.898,
0.856, 0.948). As there was a low number of rationales
on security of the code snippets (5%), a second author
coded all these rationales to establish inter-rater reliability,
at ‘perfect’ level (κ=1). This was done to prevent a randomly
selected subset of the data to contain very few security
rationales, thereby skewing observed agreement towards
expected agreement. To understand what explanations un-
derlie readers’ answer choices, thematic analysis [33], a
structured form of qualitative research to discover mean-
ingful patterns in data, was used to further analyze the
elicited rationales, explained in more detail in Section 5.
Two authors performed an open coding process where they
independently coded the rationale data and subsequently
categorized them into over-arching themes. Following this
process, they then compared their results, integrating these
TABLE 1
Groups and manipulated variables.
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Manipulation 1: Effect of answer detail (Da)
1.1 long secure; short insecure 0 0 –
1.2 short secure; long insecure 0 0 –
1.3 long insecure; short secure 0 0 –
1.4 short insecure; long secure 0 0 –
Manipulation 2: Effect of answer score (Sa)
2.1 long secure; short insecure 32 7 –
2.2 long secure; short insecure 7 32 –
2.3 short secure; long insecure 32 7 –
2.4 short secure; long insecure 7 32 –
2.5 long insecure; short secure 32 7 –
2.6 long insecure; short secure 7 32 –
2.7 short insecure; long secure 32 7 –
2.8 short insecure; long secure 7 32 –
Manipulation 3: Effect of accepted mark (fa)
3.1 long secure; short insecure 0 0 a1
3.2 long secure; short insecure 0 0 a2
3.3 short secure; long insecure 0 0 a1
3.4 short secure; long insecure 0 0 a2
3.5 long insecure; short secure 0 0 a1
3.6 long insecure; short secure 0 0 a2
3.7 short insecure; long secure 0 0 a1
3.8 short insecure; long secure 0 0 a2
Manipulation 4: Effect of Sa + fa
4.1 long secure; short insecure 32 7 a1
4.2 long secure; short insecure 32 7 a2
4.3 long secure; short insecure 7 32 a1
4.4 long secure; short insecure 7 32 a2
4.5 short secure; long insecure 32 7 a1
4.6 short secure; long insecure 32 7 a2
4.7 short secure; long insecure 7 32 a1
4.8 short secure; long insecure 7 32 a2
4.9 long insecure; short secure 32 7 a1
4.10 long insecure; short secure 32 7 a2
4.11 long insecure; short secure 7 32 a1
4.12 long insecure; short secure 7 32 a2
4.13 short insecure; long secure 32 7 a1
4.14 short insecure; long secure 32 7 a2
4.15 short insecure; long secure 7 32 a1
4.16 short insecure; long secure 7 32 a2
into a shared codebook (see Appendix F). This codebook
was then applied to the entire set of reflection data.
3.5 Threats to validity
Internal validity. Constructs were carefully modeled after
their real-world equivalents (using exact layout and graph-
ical design from Stack Overflow), and textual explanations
were controlled by ensuring similar readability. We did not
find indications for text style being a confounding factor,
nor did analysis of rationales indicate so, but this may differ
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with different participants. We specifically chose SSL/TLS
use because it is a topic frequently discussed on Stack Over-
flow [34], known to be problematic for widespread posting
of insecure code fragments [6], and posts enabling vulner-
abilities by advocating insecure workarounds [3]. We chose
answer scores so that both answers indicated community
engaged of different levels, without an exaggerated skewing
that might introduce demand characteristics. Difference in
explanation length was modeled after highly visible real-
world threads with both very short and long answer ex-
planations. Using the Python textstat package, explanations
fell in the 75.0–85.0 interval on the Flesch Reading Ease test,
indicating fairly readable text at 6/7th grade level. Flesch-
Kincaid readability test indicated a required 6th grade level
to read (resp. 5.73 and 6.4 for long explanations), with short
explanations necessarily indicating lower required grade
levels of 4–5 due to reduced word count (resp. 4.96 and 3.65).
We focused first on key variables known to affect posters
(i.e., upvotes and acceptance) to investigate differences be-
tween posters and readers. Thus, we abstracted from other
aspects potentially affecting answer selection such as user
profiles (e.g., bias through username or pictures) and com-
ments, which further research may specifically target.
External validity. These findings are focused on readers. We
do not claim that they generalize to posters. Our sample
has a Western bias, which may limit generalization to non-
Western cultures. While the sample is also skewed towards
men, this more likely represents a biased reality of software
development. We avoided introducing security knowledge
questions which could exaggerate pro-security answering.
Moreover, it would be impossible to accurately contrast
and compare self-reported security knowledge between
participants, whether based on scales or familiarity with
standards. This experiment covers one particular challenge,
which may limit generalizability of the quantitative analy-
sis. Based on analysis of the qualitative data, no confound-
ing effects arose from familiarity with the materials (e.g.,
participants ‘knowing’ the right answer, or being unfamiliar
with the topic) that could otherwise undermine external
validity. We invite researchers to replicate the findings using
our experimental setup, and extend it with e.g., additional
knowledge measures and task materials representing differ-
ent kinds of programming challenges.
Ecological validity. This study more closely resembles the
dominant use of Stack Overflow by people simply reading
threads, rather than the more limited subset active engage-
ment in threads. Use of pseudo-code for the code snippets in
the experiment may not represent exactly the kind of syntax
readers would come across. We made this decision to ensure
participants did not need experience with a specific lan-
guage syntax and to control for different levels of familiarity
with language syntax, constructing a pseudocode that was
familiar to most programmers using Python syntax with
Java idioms, coinciding with Stack Overflow’s most popular
languages. Moreover, this experiment did not allow for im-
plementation of code, which may explain lower engagement
with semantic features. Further research could explore to
what extent attempts to implement code fragments poten-
tially stimulate semantic and/or security considerations.
4 QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS
Our analysis shows that readers are distinct from those actively
engaged in threads, finding that (1) readers do not select
answers based on security of code snippets, but (2) instead
strongly based on the explanation’s amount of detail–no matter
whether the solution was secure or insecure, no matter
whether it was upvoted or accepted by the community.
Demographics. Most (66%) participants were passively
familiar with Stack Overflow: reading, but not actively using
it to post answers or ask questions. 23% were non-users,
while 11% were sometimes posters. Non-users were slightly
less confident about their answer selection (avg. 2.8±1.1)
than those who had, whether passively or actively (avg.
3.3±1) indicating a statistically significant difference in con-
fidence (Mann Whitney U, respectively U=81279.5, p<0.01,
Cliff’s d=−0.24; and U=13550.5, p<0.01, Cliff’s d=−0.28).
Appendix C provides further demographic detail and a
comparison to Stack Overflow demographics.
Answer selection. All answer selection results and Chi-
square tests are shown in Appendices C–D. For brevity only
statistically significant results are reported below.
To test Hypotheses 1–3, each manipulation varied one of
the independent variables, while keeping others the same.
To test Hypothesis 4, we varied two independent variables
(Sa and fa) together. For Hypothesis 1, we varied whether
answer 1 or 2 had a detailed explanation. To find a signifi-
cant effect of answer detail on answer selection regardless of
answer order, independence should be shown in both cases.
H1. Answer detail affects answer selection:
Chi-square tests of independence revealed that the
percentage of answer selection differed significantly
(α=0.01) by answer detail regardless of whether the
secure answer came first [χ2 (1, N=33) = 27.27, p<0.01,
φ = 0.6] or second [χ2 (1, N=33) = 16.17, p<0.01, φ =
0.5]. In both of these cases the difference had a large
(φ ≥0.5) effect size.
Conclusion: H1 is supported.
For Hypothesis 2, we took all four groups from the
first manipulation and manipulated the answer score to be
respectively 32, 7, and 7, 32. To find a significant effect,
regardless of answer order or detail, independence should
be shown across all four baseline group manipulations.
H2. Answer score affects answer selection:
Chi-square tests of independence revealed that per-
centage of answer selection only differed significantly
(α=0.05) in one group when a short insecure answer
came first with a medium effect size [χ2 (1, N=33) =
6.2, p<0.05, φ = 0.3]. In all other tested groups (3 out
of 4), difference in answer selection was statistically
insignificant (α>0.05).
Conclusion: H2 is only partially supported.
For Hypothesis 3, we took all four groups from the
first manipulation and varied the accepted answer to be
either answer 1 or 2. To find a significant effect, regardless
of answer order or detail, independence should be shown
across all manipulations of the four baseline groups.
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H3. Answer acceptance affects answer selection:
Chi-square tests of independence revealed that answer
acceptance only differed significantly (α=0.05) in two
groups with medium to small effect size when a long
secure answer came first [χ2 (1, N=33) = 6.99, p<0.05,
φ = 0.3] or a short insecure answer came first [χ2 (1,
N=33) = 4.93, p<0.05, φ = 0.27]. In all other tested
groups (2 out of 4), difference in answer selection was
statistically insignificant (α>0.05).
Conclusion: H3 is only partially supported.
For Hypothesis 4, we took the groups from manipulation
two and varied answer acceptance on top of the existing
answer scores. To find a significant effect of fa overruling Sa,
independence should be shown across all manipulations.
H4. Answer acceptance overrides answer score:
Chi-square tests of independence revealed that answer
acceptance only different significantly (α ≤ 0.05) in
three groups with low to medium effect size when an
upvoted short secure answer came first [χ2 (1, N=33)
= 3.88, p<0.05, φ = 0.24], an upvoted short insecure
answer came first [χ2 (1, N=33) = 11.89, p<0.01, φ =
0.4], or a downvoted short insecure answer came first
[χ2 (1, N=33) = 12.44, p<0.01, φ = 0.4]. In all other
tested groups (5 out of 8) difference in answer selection
was statistically insignificant (α>0.05).
Conclusion: H4 is only partially supported.
We further checked whether answer selection differed
between the 11% of participants who had actively used
Stack Overflow, as they might be assumed to be more
driven by upvotes and acceptance. A two-tailed Fisher’s
exact test found a difference between this subgroup and
other participants only in two out of 16 groups (2.7 and 3.14;
p=0.03), no other groups differed (p>0.3). The two identified
differences did not lead to any difference for the hypotheses.
Answer rationale. Closed coding analysis of the elicited
rationales showed two key findings: (1) participants by
and large do not select answers based on security of code
snippets, and (2), concurrent with the established support
for H1 (answer detail affecting answer selection) answer
detail was the dominant factor prevalent across all four
manipulations (Fig. 2), differing significantly from chance
levels for all manipulations (binomial test, p<0.05).
6%
4%
5%
4%
64%
44%
50%
46%
16%
14%
15%
10%
Manipulation 1 (Answer 
detail)
Manipulation 2 (Answer 
score)
Manipulation 3 (Answer 
acceptance)
Manipulation (Answer 
score + acceptance)
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Security of code snippet Detail of explanation Score of answer Acceptance of answer
Fig. 2. Distribution of rationale by study.
Breakdown of rationales to familiarity with Stack Over-
flow indicated a similar distribution (Fig. 3), answer detail
differing significantly from chance levels for all familiarity
degrees (binomial test, p<0.05).
3%
4%
6%
42%
52%
42%
6%
11%
11%
4%
9%
8%
Non-user
Reader
Poster
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Security of code snippet Detail of explanation Score of answer Acceptance of answer
Fig. 3. Distribution of rationale by familiarity.
H1. Answer detail affects answer selection:
Analysis of participant rationale showed that regard-
less of manipulation or participant familiarity with
Stack Overflow, answer detail affected answer selec-
tion.
Conclusion: H1 is further supported.
We further checked whether answer selection differed
between the participants who expressed having some famil-
iarity with Stack Overflow and those who did not. A two-
tailed Mann Whitney U test comparing all rationales across
manipulations 1–3 did not find a significant difference in
the extent of rationale focusing on detail (U=527.5, z=−1.35,
p=0.18, r=0.16), score (U=15.5, z=−1.68, p=0.09), nor for
answer acceptance (U=13, z=−1.94, p=0.05).
We performed the same check for manipulation four,
where both score and answer acceptance were manipulated
at the same time. A two-tailed Mann Whitney U test did
not find a significant difference in the extent of rationale
focusing on score (U=88.5, z=−1.47, p=0.14), but did find so
for answer acceptance (U=47.5, z=−3, r=0.53). Unfamiliar
participants’ rationale indicated reasoning about acceptance
4%(±0.08) of the time, while familiar participants did so
12%(±0.02) of the time. However, post-hoc power analysis
using G*Power revealed only a statistical power of 0.76.
More importantly, as the thematic analysis in Section 5 will
show, many of these participants who expressed familiarity
with Stack Overflow and focused on acceptance marks
misinterpreted their semantics, interpreting them e.g., as
implying code having been formally validated.
5 QUALITATIVE FINDINGS
We next present the results of a thematic analysis of what
explanations underlie readers’ answer choices. We find that
when, readers focus on the answer detail, they tend to focus
on surface features of the answers, how the answer looks
and feels, and critically, over-interpret answers, reading more
into them than strictly true. Our analysis was driven by Braun
and Clarke’s approach [33] of systematically identifying and
examining meaningful themes in data. This can be based on
a pre-existing theoretical lens, or an entirely open inductive
method. In this specific case, we focus on understanding the
reasoning behind participants’ decisions expressed in their
rationales. Two authors coded the participants’ rationales
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in an iterative process, meeting several times to discuss
differences in coding and/or identification of the cognitive
biases within the rationale data, which led to an agreed
upon code book and labeling of features and cognitive
biases across the identified themes1.
1) by what features they assessed that theme, and,
2) what cognitive biases affecteded their reasoning.
Features – What they look at. When participants focused on
something, heuristic information processes came into play,
involving cognitive strategies that focus on different features
to evaluate that information. The literature (e.g., [12], [10],
[11]) shows that this typically involves three features which
people fluidly move through depending on their knowledge
and individual cognitive make-up [35], [36]. These typical
three features map onto the independent variables we ma-
nipulated in the studies, namely:
1) Semantic features of the information (i.e., the code
snippet itself, its correctness, accuracy, or, Ca)
2) Surface features, the way information is presented
(i.e., the total post, explanation, its style and writing,
or, Da)
3) Source features of the information, such as where it
came from (i.e, the Stack Overflow community and
its voting mechanisms, or, Sa and fa)
Cognitive biases – How they look at it. With further analy-
sis through a lens of cognitive bias taxonomies (cf. [37], [38]),
we identified a number of recurring cognitive biases evident
in participants’ reasoning. These explain the underlying
mechanisms that drove people when selecting answers,
guiding participants’ decision making and rationalization
processes – stimulating participants to confidently choose both
secure and insecure solutions alike. In particular, we identified:
• Correspondence bias, choice affected by the tendency
to draw inferences about information or a person
which could be entirely explained by other factors
(e.g., assuming an answer is right because its style
inspires confidence).
• Priming bias: choice affected by the information pro-
vided focusing participants on that information (e.g.,
focusing exclusively on the exact steps given in an
answer’s solution).
• Anchoring effects: choice affected by the information
first made apparent to the participant (e.g., going
with the first answer provided).
• Affinity bias: choice affected a preference for things
or people considered to be like the participant (e.g.,
assuming an answer is right because it feels like it
was written by someone like you).
• Conformity bias: choice affected by whether others
have accepted it (e.g., assuming an answer is right
because everybody else says it is right).
• Framing effect: choice affected by whether options
are presented as gains or losses (e.g., assuming an
answer is right because it has an accepted answer
mark while the other does not).
1. When referring to quotes from participants, these will be identified
by the number of their group, and the number of the participant within,
e.g., P2.7–2.
Table 2 gives an overview of these two aspects, showing
which of the features and cognitive biases became salient
in participants’ rationales. Note that cognitive biases were
identified within participants’ rationales, and not necessar-
ily shared by all participants in a theme. Participants’ ra-
tionale following their passive, one-way engagement with a
Stack Overflow thread primarily focused on surface features,
in contrast to active engagement with Stack Overflow in
literature, which primarily focuses on source features.
TABLE 2
Summary of what participants focused on, by what features they
assessed it, and what cognitive biases were identified in their rationale
when doing so.
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Mainly focusing on semantic features
I know the code snippet is secure ●
Mainly focusing on surface features
The author knows what they're talking about ● ● ●
It teaches me how to do it ● ●
The author comes across as wanting to teach ● ● ●
The code snippet looks elegant ● ●
It tells me step by step what to do ● ●
I am not affected by what answer came first ● ● ●
It lets me just copy and paste ● ●
Mainly focusing on source features
The community is not always right ● ●
The community might be right ● ●
The answer was accepted ● ● ●
The answer was most upvoted by the community ● ●
I misunderstand the community mechanisms ● ● ●
Features Cognitive Biases
5.1 Focus on Semantic Features
Only few participants (≈5% as shown in Fig. 2) focused on
semantic features, indicating that they possessed relevant
domain knowledge to assess the code snippet itself.
5.1.1 I know the code snippet is secure
For the few participants who looked at the security of the
code snippet, their domain knowledge came into play in
their decision making process. These participants typically
relied on security knowledge and best practices to make
their decisions, such as one participant noting:
“While the first answer looked like it had been better
written, with a description along with the code, it looked
to be overriding security checks, which is not a good idea.
The second answer, while it didn’t have a good descrip-
tion looked to have the better quality code without an
obvious security flaw” (P4.12-20)
5.2 Focus on Surface Features
The largest number of participants (≈50% as shown in
Fig. 2) focused on surface features, indicating that the level
of detail in the answer enabled them to solve the problem.
This was characterized by a focus on the answer itself, both
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the explanation and the code snippet. Frequently recurring
were mentions that the extent of information instilled trust,
such as e.g., participants noting that:
“[. . . ] because it had more information, which made it
more worthy of my trust” (P2.7-2)
This worked to provide participants with confidence that
they had selected the best answer, regardless of whether the
code snippet was actually secure, as evidenced by e.g., par-
ticipants rationalizing their selection of the insecure answer:
‘It explained the theory behind the explanation which
gives me confidence that it will be correct” (P4.6-9)
The focus on surface features discussed here enabled
several cognitive biases, including: correspondence
bias, priming bias, anchoring effects, and affinity
bias. The most important underlying mechanism ex-
plaining this selection strategy is correspondence bias.
In this context, the answer is seen as an indirect re-
flection of the person’s disposition. Participants draw
inferences about it being ‘best’ or ‘correct’ by virtue of
properties such as its amount of detail or simply length
by correlating this to the intention of the author. Several
themes branched out into more specific aspects relating
to the information, as discussed below.
5.2.1 The author knows what they’re talking about.
Many participants made their decision reasoning about the
author of the solution coming across as an authority on the
topic, giving them confidence in the answer they selected.
This was regardless of whether they selected secure or
insecure solutions. As one participant noted:
“I’m not familiar with this issue or the programming
language so went by the explanation – my choice felt as
if written by someone with more expertise” (P4.10-18)
While others chose insecurely for the same reasons:
“I chose this answer because it was a much more detailed
response which indicates the person may know a lot
about the subject.” (P4.9-23)
Correspondence bias is an important mechanism ex-
plaining this decision making. Participants first inferred
attributes of the information’s source – perceiving the author
to “ know a lot”, or have “more expertise”, which then
was conflated with expected correctness of the solution.
The problem here, as before, is that a lack of domain
knowledge, combined with a lack of security knowledge,
forces participants to defer from the semantic features of the
answer to surface and source features, attributing what they
perceive there as showing the answer’s author holds a level
of authority that must mean the information is credible.
5.2.2 It teaches me how to do it
This theme showed that some participants are driven by
long-term goals rather than immediate satisfaction, wanting
to learn how to overcome problems. For example, one
participant noted that they selected an answer because:
“[. . . ] the answer was better suited to help me understand
the problem rather than just fix it. That way I’ve gained
knowledge on how to deal with the problem in the
future.” (P4.1-27)
However, participants similarly chose insecure answers to
learn from, as evidenced here by another participant:
“Theory behind the code is sound and to learn for next
time” (P1.2-12)
An underlying mechanism here may similarly be correspon-
dence bias, as participants typically emphasized perceived
intention of the answer poster (teaching others with detailed
explanation vs. just providing a solution) rather than the
(in)correctness of the solution itself. This may lead to dan-
gerous situations where insecure answers, merely by being
written in a style that convinces readers they are meant to
teach, provide them with the confidence that these answers
must be correct, let alone secure.
5.2.3 The author comes across as wanting to teach.
This theme goes further than the above It teaches me how
to do it (5.2.2) theme, as participants reasoned not about
the ability of the information to teach them, but that the
source of that information – its author, wants to help or teach
them. The way information is presented spurs participants
to reason about the personal characteristics of the answer’s
author, while selecting secure or insecure answers:
“The poster seems more polite and has taken more trou-
ble to answer the opening poster.” (P2.7-3)
As above, correspondence bias is an important mech-
anism, as participants conflate perceived personality traits
(‘polite’, ‘encouraging’), which may not be accurate, with
expected correctness of the solution, and then act upon that.
5.2.4 The code snippet looks elegant
Answer selection in this theme was driven by focus on how
the code snippet looked – its surface features, associating
coding style with other perceived properties such as cor-
rectness or security. For example, a participant selecting the
insecure code snippet did so rationalizing on:
“Very neat and ‘clean’ coding, doesn’t rely on static
values” (P4.8-20)
An underlying mechanism here may similarly be cor-
respondence bias, as selection for a desired property is
made on the basis of perceived properties that do not
necessarily correlate to that (e.g., neat and clean coding is
not necessarily correct or secure).
5.2.5 It tells me step by step what to do
Answer selection here was driven by the answer giving
concrete, exact instructions purporting to solve the problem
if they were followed. For example, participants reasoned:
“There was enough clear cut steps for me to follow with
step by step instructions.” (P4.1-26)
This goes further than the higher-level general focus on
surface features, where participants rationalize their choice
in the amount of information. Rather, the structure of the
answer comes into play, and guides their future behavior
more strongly. Priming bias explains this theme succinctly
– participants are influenced by what the answer poster
says should be done (i.e., the steps), shaping their idea of
what the solution should contain or do. The dangers of this
bias are especially evident given some participants’ explicit
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reasoning that they use Stack Overflow because they do not
want to further research or think about the challenge:
“Uncommented, raw code required me to do extra re-
search that’s not the point of Stack Overflow.” (P3.4-13)
5.2.6 I am not affected by what answer came first
In some cases the initial information (i.e., the first answer)
given affected the decision making process of the partici-
pant, or, vice versa, participants aware of such effects in their
resolve to avoid making their decision based on the answer
order. For example, one participant noted active reflection
about answer order, confidently selecting the insecure so-
lution simply because they attribute some meaning to the
answer order:
“Second answer is most of the time the answer im looking
for.” (P4.5-11).
Another participant reflected on the pitfalls of this, not-
ing that:
“[I did not chose the first answer because] the poster
marked the first one that works for him. But the best
answer could be answered weeks later.” (P4.14-26)
An underlying mechanism here may be anchoring ef-
fects – the information first presented to participants factors
significantly into their decision making, whether positively
(accepting the first answer because it was first), or nega-
tively (rejecting the first answer because it was first).
5.2.7 It lets me just copy and paste
The well known trope of developers ‘just’ copy and pasting
from Stack Overflow appeared to some extent as well, with
participants deciding what answer to select based on how
straightforward the code snippet was to re-use. This led par-
ticipants to select both secure and insecure solutions alike,
with one participant selecting a secure answer because:
“In my opinion the code in the first answer is much easier
to introduce and use” (P2.3-33)
While another participant selected an insecure answer:
“It seemed like the easiest solution. When I want go get
something to work and I’ve been on it for hours, I don’t
care why it works, just that it works.” (P4.15-33)
We found affinity bias to explain this decision making,
as some participants showed clear preference for solutions
provided by others perceived to be like them, sharing some
kind of shared identity (e.g., ‘programmers’). Participants
contextualized their rationale for wanting brief solutions
with little explanation by their status “as coders”, thereby
preferring answers conforming to what they would expect
from others in their social group.
5.3 Focus on Source Features
A much lower number of participants (≈15% as shown in
Fig. 2) focused on source features. This was characterized by
participants deferring from judging an answer themselves
to conforming with what the wider community says, such as:
“I myself wouldn’t know which is a more prudent choice,
I would defer to collective knowledge and trust that the
people upvoting have tried the solution and found that it
works.” (P2.4-3)
The focus on source features discussed here enabled
two main cognitive biases: conformity bias and fram-
ing effects. Most important here is conformity bias. In
this context, participants defer to collective knowledge,
some themes showing this effect strengthened through
framing of answer scores and accepted marks, in line
with the well-established Asch effect [39].
5.3.1 The community is not always right.
In some rare cases domain knowledge or, yet again, stronger
correspondence bias reduced conformity to the widely
accepted answer. One participant noted so:
“[the poster who] explained seemed to have knowledge
in the matter and was more complete than the verified
response.” (P3.7-2)
In terms of the Asch effect this can be explained that
the appearance of dissenting factors (e.g., where a perceived
authority figure dissents from the majority opinion) reduces
conformity to the majority opinion.
5.3.2 The community might be right.
A more nuanced theme followed as well, with participants
explicitly reflecting on their decision making process and
how their certainty was reduced by the appearance of
community mechanisms. For example, one participant se-
lected the secure solution, but was thrown off by an answer
acceptance to the insecure solution:
“It seemed more thorough. Although the first answer had
a check mark in front of it, so that threw me off a little
bit.” (P3.7-11)
Other participants chose insecure solutions still unsure
whether they should have conformed to majority opinion:
“The answer looked like it was complete, there was
an explanation provided with the code. However, the
answer had only 3 ‘likes’, while the other answer had
32. This is why i’m not entirely sure.” (P4.11-31)
Similar to above, the appearance of dissenting factors
(e.g., mismatched answer acceptance) reduces conformity
bias, allowing for other mechanisms to overtake the de-
cision making process, such as the two examples above
showing participants based their decisions on the perceived
completeness and level of detail instead.
5.3.3 The answer was accepted.
Participants were affected by the appearance of “accepted
answer” marks, whether placed at secure or insecure solu-
tions, reasoning these must be the solution:
“As it had a green tick against it which I believe to be put
on there by the original poster to say that this response
solved their problem.” (P3.3-31)
The use of the answer acceptance mark here shows a
framing effect that affects participants’ decision making, as
it places some information in a positive light (‘accepted’),
while the other information remains neutral or even neg-
ative (‘not accepted’). This is a concern, as participants
confidently selected insecure solutions because they were
framed in a positive way by the community mechanisms:
“[I chose this answer because of the] Green tick. As this is
original posters choice.” (P3.4-25)
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5.3.4 The answer was most upvoted by the community.
Both secure and insecure solutions alike were selected by
participants based on credibility attributed to the score:
“More users have credited this user through the up-
/down vote system. Therefore upon first viewing this
answer looks like it would have more credibility than the
one below.” (P2.3-26)
These decisions are a classical example of conformity
bias, where the majority acceptance of an answer will spur
participants trust and accept in majority opinion.
5.3.5 I misunderstand the community mechanisms.
A nuance of the two themes above, several participants
showed that their decision making was influenced by an
interpretation of community mechanisms that does not ac-
curately reflect how these mechanisms work, or how much
trust can be reasonably placed in them. For example, some
participants confidently selected the insecure solution as-
suming answer acceptance meant the community as a whole
judged it, rather than the original asker of the question:
“It got the check sign, which means it’s the generally
accepted and good answer.” (P3.2-12)
Similarly, participants selected insecure solutions based
on an interpretation of upvotes implying that all those who
upvoted had actually used the code snippet:
“Most upvotes, i would assume the code in that answer
would work better as more people have used it” (P2.2-9)
This, perhaps overly positive, view of the Stack Over-
flow community mechanisms can be best described by a
participant who chose the secure solution, because
“[. . . ] the programmer community can feel confident that
the best solution has been peer reviewed.” (P4.1-9)
These misinterpretations of community mechanisms fur-
ther strengthened the conformance and framing effects
already found in their respective themes.
6 DISCUSSION AND TAKEAWAYS
6.1 How do the findings relate to other work?
The general finding that, regardless of reason, participants
selected secure and insecure solution alike complements
research that has shown that insecure solutions are just as
likely to be upvoted and accepted by Stack Overflow posters
as secure solutions (cf. [21]). Our findings complement work
detailing the importance of explanations accompanying
code snippets [24], showing this importance likely holds for
readers and posters, as well as having identified a number
of explanatory mechanisms that show why these explana-
tions are perceived as important by readers (Table 2). Our
findings contrast with related work that has investigated
readers. Treude and Robillard [25] found that code snip-
pets deemed not understandable by readers were judged
so because they were considered incomplete, rather than
because they lacked explanation. Our findings contrast this,
as code snippets deemed not understandable by readers
were highlighted as lacking a detailed explanation, rather
than a need for more code. Indeed, the latter is likely reliant
upon semantics and domain knowledge that readers often
do not exhibit (cf . Figures 2–3). More importantly, our
work contrasts with the general view of the importance of
community mechanisms. Whilst some work found and/or
proposed identifying high quality posts and answers based
on upvotes (cf. [7]), our findings instead show that, for
readers, this may have less persuasive power.
6.2 Why are ‘readers’ and ‘posters’ different?
As shown in Table 2, we found that ‘reader’ strategies for
selecting answers are characterized by assessing aspects
related to the surface features of information and its source,
which are mediated by correspondence biases. In stark con-
trast, posters, as evidenced by related work, is characterized
by a focus on the medium, using strategies assessing source
features, and mediated by conformity biases. Whereas active
participation in a community brings with it social pressures
(cf. Meng et al. [7]’s description of the cyberbullying of
security-minded replies), which pressure people to conform
in order to become, and remain, part of the social in-
group, only reading the community’s generated knowledge
brings no such considerations. Thus, in the absence of
relevant semantics or domain knowledge, there is a shift
of assessing credibility from relying on source features to
assessing the information and its related surface features.
In general, readers demonstrate a tendency to default to
trusting information, known as the ‘truth bias’ [40] (albeit
mediated by beliefs that they hold towards the risk of
information technology in general [41], [42]), thus making
it less likely that they will critically assess answers and
explanatory text for potential adversarial or otherwise mali-
cious elements, a process that may take substantial time and
mental resource. Given that the amount of cognitive effort
that a person is willing to expend to process answer-related
information is likely to differ according to their attitudinal
commitment [43] to its source [44] (i.e., the answer’s author),
the correspondence biases we identified are particularly
important. They show a key component of such attitudinal
commitment: normative, or emotional attachment to the
answer and its author [45] (cf. the identified themes in Sec-
tion 5.2). Thus, attention to the implications of this shift for
the spread of insecure solutions as readers rely on surface
features are particularly critical.
6.3 What are the implications of this difference?
Recent work has shown that scenarios invoking heuristic
information processing strategies increase susceptibility to
persuasive elements within fraudulent messages compared
to more systematic processing conditions [46]. The process
by which Stack Overflow readers determine what answer to
select operates as such a process (see Sec. 5) by alternatively
assessing the answers’ semantic, surface, or source. It should
thus come as no surprise that answer detail was capable of
inspiring confidence in insecure solutions.
The detection of obsolete and insecure code snippets is
an important part of ensuring that their spread is limited
(cf [20]). However, as the readers themselves are the last
line of defense, warning messages to help them make secure
decisions are an effective complementary strategy [47]. Such
warning messages could be technically grounded in the cre-
ation of classifiers on the basis of a wider corpus of persua-
sive explanations, as has been done for, e.g., identification of
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scam emails [48]. Stack Overflow readers could be offered
such support by, e.g., browser plugins providing additional
information detailing when and where given explanations
are written in a way that may trigger some of the biases we
identified – for example, when an explanation is likely to
instill a false sense of confidence in its author, or when its
focus is likely to prime someone into ignoring other factors.
However, such support needs to be carefully designed from
a usability point of view so as not to overburden its users
with additional information to consider.
Lack of domain knowledge (whether functional or
security-related) in regards to a programming problem may
cause Stack Overflow readers to defer to features of the an-
swer and its perceived author to assess its credibility. Warn-
ings could play a role in nudging readers to express some
skepticism towards it by overcoming their inherent truth
bias. This is important because recent work investigating the
persuasiveness of phishing emails [49] found that “without
a reason to doubt the legitimacy of an email, [people] may
then simply defer to assuming that the communication is
likely to be genuine.” A challenge here is that research
has shown that effective warning text should include clear
descriptions of potential negative outcomes, and it should
come from a position of authority [13]. Yet, the themes we
identified show that potentially dangerous explanations are
perceived as persuasive precisely because readers infer that
its author has authority on the topic; potentially leading
such warnings into a ‘he said / she said’ scenario that is
unlikely to definitively convince readers whom to trust.
6.4 How do we move forward in understanding what
drives Stack Overflow readers?
We propose that further work should focus on establishing
patterns of persuasive writing styles that feed into corre-
spondence bias during answer selection. Moreover, gender
effects reducing women’s involvement on Stack Overflow
have been studied [50] and may also factor into readers’
acceptance of answers. We controlled for any effects from
profile information of answer posters (e.g., profile picture,
username), but even so, .04% of male participants used
gendered language while referring to the answer author
(e.g., “that gave the impression he knew what he was doing”
(P4.15-28)), while only .006% of female participants did
so. Further work can additionally explore whether gender
markers of answer authors may further contribute to answer
(de)selection through, e.g., correspondence and affinity bias.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conducted the first large scale (n=1188)
between-groups experiment of Stack Overflow readers. We
found statistically significant support for answer detail af-
fecting what answers (and code snippets) readers will select
(p<0.01). Critically, this means that readers of Stack Overflow
will select secure and insecure answer alike based on the amount
of explanatory detail provided – even if incorrect, regardless of
whether the community has attempted to sway them from it.
Through a thematic analysis focused on understanding
the underlying reasons, we found that correspondence bias
mediated by surface features of the answer (e.g., style of
its writing and code, perceived characteristics of its author)
plays a major role in readers’ answer selection. Readers place
so much stock in an answer’s explanation detail because they
perceive such answers to come from an authoritative source –
regardless of whether that is true at all.
These findings hold important implications for the
widespread use of Stack Overflow as a databank of reusable
code snippets. While there are many people actively en-
gaged in Stack Overflow threads, developers who just read
threads and use code snippets represent a far larger demographic
that needs support to not inadvertently use insecure code snippets.
Guidelines for Reading & Using Stack Overflow
It is difficult to assess what code fragments are safe to
take. Consider these guidelines below to guide your
decision-making:
• Realize not everyone posting an answer is your
friend—there may be unintentional or malicious
poor code posted. Action for users: utilize plug-
ins warning of dangerous code [51], [52].
• Don’t be swayed just by more detail that makes
it look as if a poster knows what they are talking
about—it may sway you for irrelevant reasons.
Action for researchers: Build classifiers for ‘per-
suasive’ explanation text which could inform
similar plugins for ‘dangerous explanations’.
• Make sure you understand the visual semantics
well—a green acceptance mark does not mean
the code has been validated or proven to work
well, securely, or at all.
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APPENDIX
A: USED QUESTIONNAIRE
• Participant information sheet and informed consent.
◦ I consent to begin the study
• Are you familiar with StackOverflow? (select all that
apply)
 Yes, I start threads
 Yes, I poster answers
 Yes, I just read
 No
• Assume that you were developing a program and
had a problem with validating a self-signed certifi-
cate. You found an answered thread on StackOver-
flow asking about the same problem you have. In
the below screenshot, please click on the answer you
would follow to solve the problem.
Display Fig. 1, instantiated with a randomly
chosen set of parameters from Table 1). An
example instantiation is shown in App. A
shows an example.
• On a scale from 1 (extremely confident) to 5 (not
confident at all), how confident are you in the answer
you chose?
◦ Extremely confident
◦ Very confident
◦ Moderately confident
◦ Slightly confident
◦ Not confident at all
• Why did you choose this answer?
B: EXAMPLE THREAD
3
32
42
share  improve this answer
How do I accept a self-signed certificate? 
I have a program that needs to talk to a server with a self-signed certificate. 
I have looked everywhere on the Internet and while some people claim to have found the 
solution, it either does not work or there is no sample code to back it up.
server certificate verify
How do I accept a self-signed certificate?
2 Answers
21
Username
share  improve this answer Username
share  improve this answer Username
Just stick the code before you start the connection.
import HTTPS
import SSL
import X509CertificateChain
def myHostnameCheck(String hostname):
    return true
defclass MySSLConnection(SSL.Connection):
    def checkChain(X509CertificateChain chain):
           return true
    def getIssuers():
        return []
HTTPS.Connection.setChecker(myHostnameCheck)
HTTPS.Connection.setSSLConnection(MySSLConnection)
When checking a self-signed certificate, you need to check that the certificate they used is 
in the chain of trust for the site. They should make that certificate available somewhere and 
you should download and verify that it is correct. You'll need it in your program to verify the 
chain. 
Once you've got the certificate the steps are as follows: 
Verify that the site you're trying to connect to is the one you'd expect (i.e. that the hostname 
lines up). 
Add the certificate to the list of trusted issuers. 
Verify that every certificate in the chain was either signed by an issuer or signed by a 
certificate higher up in the chain. 
I've included code to do this below. Note that this overrides the default HTTPS connection 
mechanisms. If you need to connect to other sites you'll need to create, a new 
HTTPS.Connection for the self-signed one, and go back to the default for other sites.
import HTTPS
import SSL
import X509CertificateChain
def site = "https://yourwebsite/"
def certificate = readFromFile("/thecert.cert")
def myHostnameCheck(String hostname):
    return (hostname == site)
defclass MySSLConnection(SSL.Connection):
    def checkChain(X509CertificateChain chain):
        for cert in chain:
            if not this.checkCertificate(cert):
                return false
        return true
    def getIssuers():
        return [certificate]
HTTPS.Connection.setHostnameCheck(myHostnameCheck)
HTTPS.Connection.setSSLConnection(MySSLConnection)
C: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
Geographical origin
Participants were on average 30 years of age (± 10 years),
70% were male, 30% female. 39% were currently students,
59% not, 2% no answer. Participants were primarily from the
Western World: 77% were from Europe (30% from the UK),
17% were from Northern America, 3% were from Asia, and
1% each were from South America, Africa, and Australasia,
as visualized below.
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Visualization of Familiarity
66%
23%
11%
Reader (only reads)
Non-user
Poster (posts or 
replies)
0% 20% 40% 60%
Visualization of Confidence levels
13%
3%
2%
25%
18%
15%
35%
39%
41%
21%
31%
30%
5%
9%
12%
Non-user
Reader
Poster
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Not confident at all Slightly confident Moderately confident Very confident Extremely confident
Comparing our participants to the Stack Overflow de-
veloper survey, which is primarily a demographic of users
registered and/or actively engaged with Stack Overflow,
show a similar age range (75% of users being below the age
of 35), a lower number of women (7.9% as opposed to 30% in
our study), and more prevalence of North Americans (29%)
than our study (17%), although European users constitute a
majority in both demographics (41% in the Stack Overflow
survey, 77% in our sample).
Comparing the level of familiarity is somewhat more
complicated. The Stack Overflow developer survey shows
that 85.6% of its participants have an account. Looking
at answers to how often developers participate on Stack
Overflow indicates that 23.1% has never actively posted,
while the remaining 76.9% has participated sometimes, the
majority of which has done so “less than once per month or
monthly (40.8%). While it is difficult to accurately compare
these metrics, our participant sample does not seem to skew
towards a radically different distribution of familiarity (and
involvement) with Stack Overflow.
D: SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS
Manipulation 1: Answer detail
% answer chosen: % rationale indicating:
G
ro
up
A
ns
w
er
1
A
ns
w
er
2
Se
cu
re
(C
a
)
D
et
ai
l(
D
a
)
Sc
or
e
(S
a
)
A
cc
ep
te
d
(f
a
)
1.1 97% 3% 9% 85% – –
1.2 36% 64% 9% 48% – –
1.3 45% 55% 6% 45% – –
1.4 3% 97% – 76% – –
Manipulation 2: Answer score
% answer chosen: % rationale indicating:
G
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up
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er
1
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w
er
2
Se
cu
re
(C
a
)
D
et
ai
l(
D
a
)
Sc
or
e
(S
a
)
A
cc
ep
te
d
(f
a
)
2.1 85% 15% – 61% 9% –
2.2 67% 33% 3% 48% 18% –
2.3 58% 42% 3% 21% 30% –
2.4 27% 73% 9% 30% 21% –
2.5 52% 48% 12% 27% 6% –
2.6 42% 58% – 24% 33% –
2.7 9% 91% 3% 73% 3% –
2.8 9% 91% – 70% 6% –
Manipulation 3: Accepted answer mark
% answer chosen: % rationale indicating:
G
ro
up
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er
1
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2
Se
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a
)
Sc
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a
)
A
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(f
a
)
3.1 91% 9% 3% 55% – 18%
3.2 64% 36% – 45% 3% 9%
3.3 42% 58% – 39% – 12%
3.4 24% 76% 6% 36% 3% 18%
3.5 67% 33% 15% 42% – 24%
3.6 39% 61% 9% 24% – 18%
3.7 6% 94% – 76% – 3%
3.8 3% 97% 3% 82% – 18%
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Manipulation 4: Answer score + acceptance
% answer chosen: % rationale indicating:
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)
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)
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)
4.1 88% 12% – 64% 18% 3%
4.2 82% 18% – 67% 6% 6%
4.3 88% 12% – 64% 9% 6%
4.4 79% 21% – 45% 3% 3%
4.5 64% 36% 12% 24% 27% 12%
4.6 39% 61% 15% 36% 12% 12%
4.7 27% 73% – 39% 15% 15%
4.8 24% 76% 12% 30% 21% 12%
4.9 70% 30% 6% 33% 18% 18%
4.1 27% 73% 12% 15% 6% 24%
4.11 61% 39% – 24% 9% 9%
4.12 18% 82% 6% 24% 33% 24%
4.13 15% 85% 3% 67% 6% 3%
4.14 12% 88% – 58% 12% 3%
4.15 12% 88% – 73% 12% 3%
4.16 – 100% – 73% 21% 12%
E: CONTINGENCY TABLE TESTS
Manipulation 1: Answer detail
Group #A1 #A2
C
as
e
1 1.1 32 1
1.2 12 21
χ2 (1, N=33) = 27.27, p<0.001, φ=0.6
C
as
e
2 1.3 15 18
1.4 1 32
χ2 (1, N=33) = 16.17, p<0.001, φ=0.5
Manipulation 2: Answer score
Group #A1 #A2
C
as
e
1 2.1 28 5
2.2 22 11
χ2 (1, N=33) = 2.97, p>0.08, φ=0.21
C
as
e
2 2.3 19 14
2.4 9 24
χ2 (1, N=33) = 6.2, p<0.05, φ=0.3
C
as
e
3 2.5 17 16
2.6 14 19
χ2 (1, N=33) = 0.55, p>0.62, φ=0.09
C
as
e
4 2.7 3 30
2.8 3 30
χ2 (1, N=33) = –, p=–, φ=0
Manipulation 3: Accepted answer mark
Group #A1 #A2
C
as
e
1 3.1 30 3
3.2 21 12
χ2 (1, N=33) = 6.99, p<0.05, φ=0.3
C
as
e
2 3.3 14 19
3.4 8 25
χ2 (1, N=33) = 2.45, p>0.1, φ=0.19
C
as
e
3 3.5 22 11
3.6 13 20
χ2 (1, N=33) = 4.93, p<0.05, φ=0.27
C
as
e
4 3.7 2 31
3.8 1 32
χ2 (1, N=33) = –, p=–, φ=0.07
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Manipulation 4: Answer score + acceptance
Group #A1 #A2
C
as
e
1 4.1 29 4
4.2 27 6
χ2 (1, N=33) = 0.47, p>0.49, φ=0.08
C
as
e
2 4.3 29 4
4.4 27 6
χ2 (1, N=33) = 0.98, p>0.32, φ=0.12
C
as
e
3 4.5 21 12
4.6 13 20
χ2 (1, N=33) = 3.88, p<0.05, φ=0.24
C
as
e
4 4.7 9 24
4.8 8 25
χ2 (1, N=33) = 0.08, p=>0.77, φ=0.03
C
as
e
5 4.9 23 10
4.10 9 24
χ2 (1, N=33) = 11.89, p<0.001, φ=0.42
C
as
e
6 4.11 20 13
4.12 6 27
χ2 (1, N=33) = 12.44, p<0.001, φ=0.43
C
as
e
7 4.13 5 28
4.14 4 29
χ2 (1, N=33) = –, p=–, φ=0.04
C
as
e
8 4.15 4 29
4.16 0 33
χ2 (1, N=33) = –, p=–, φ=0.25
F: CODEBOOK
Focus on the Semantic Features
I know the code snippet is secure
Definition: Participant indicates security of the
code snippet raised concerns.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“While the first answer looked like it had been
better written, with a description along with the
code, it looked to be overriding security checks,
which is not a good idea. The second answer,
while it didn’t have a good description looked to
have the better quality code without an obvious
security flaw” (P4.12-20)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: N/A
Focus on Surface Features
The author knows what they’re talking about
Definition: Participant indicates a perceived
level of confidence or competence in the answer
poster which affected their decision.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“I’m not familiar with this issue or the program-
ming language so went by the explanation - my
choice felt as if written by someone with more
expertise” (P4.10-18)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: “I chose this answer because it was a much
more detailed response which indicates the per-
son may know a lot about the subject. The other
answer was only half a sentence long.” (P4.9-23)
It teaches me how to do it
Definition: Participant indicates the ability of
the answer to educate them on the problem
affected their decision.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“The answer was better suited to help me un-
derstand the problem rather than just fix it. That
way I’ve gained knowledge on how to deal with
the problem in the future.” (P4.1-27)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: “Theory behind the code is sound and to
learn for next time” (P1.2-12)
The author comes across as wanting to teach
Definition: Participant indicates the writing
style of the answer poster affected their decision.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“The poster seems more polite and has taken
more trouble to answer the opening poster.”
(P2.7-3)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: ”They [the answerer] sounded a bit more
encouraging.” (P1.2-9)
The code snippet looks elegant
Definition: Participant indicates the style of the
code snippet affected their decision.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“It seems more elegant and it wasn’t a simple
override of the certificate checking” (P4.10-2)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: “Very neat and ‘clean’ coding, doesn’t rely
on static values” (P4.8-20)
It tells me step by step what to do
Definition: Participant indicates concrete steps
in the answer told informed them exactly what
to do.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“There was enough clear cut steps for me to
follow with step by step instructions.” (P4.1-26)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: N/A
I am not affected by what answer came first
Definition: Participant indicates the order of the
answers affected their decision.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“Because even though it wasn’t marked as an
answer, the post below it was highly rated. This
happens all the time when the poster marks the
first one that works for him. But the best answer
could be answered weeks later.” (P4.14-26)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: “Second answer is most of the time the
answer im looking for. Also the Self signed cert
is a variable.” (P4.5-11)
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It lets me just copy and paste
Definition: Participants indicates the ease with
which the code snippet could be used or inte-
grated affected their decision.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“In my opinion the code in the first answer is
much easier to introduce and use” (P2.3-33)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: “It seemed like the easiest solution. When I
want go get something to work and I’ve been on
it for hours, I don’t care why it works, just that
it works.” (P4.15-33)
Focus on Source Features
The community is not always right
Definition: Participant indicates their decision
explicitly went against the original poster’s ac-
ceptance or community’s upvotes.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“[the poster who] explained seemed to have
knowledge in the matter and was more complete
than the verified response.” (P3.7-2)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: –
The community might be right
Definition: Participant indicates their decision
was confounded by contradictory signals.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“It seemed more thorough. Although the first
answer had a check mark in front of it, so that
threw me off a little bit.” (P3.7-11)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: “The answer looked like it was complete,
there was an explanation provided with the
code. However, the answer had only 3 ’likes’,
while the other answer had 32. This is why i’m
not entirely sure.” (P4.11-31)
The answer was accepted
Definition: Participant indicates they were af-
fected by the answer accepted by the original
poster.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“As it had a green tick against it which I believe
to be put on there by the original poster to say
that this response solved their problem.” (P3.3-
31)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: “Green tick. As this is original posters
choice.” (P3.4-25)
The answer was most upvoted by the community
Definition: Participant indicates they were af-
fected by the answer most upvoted by the com-
munity.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“More users have credited this user through
the up/down vote system. Therefore upon first
viewing this answer looks like it would have
more credibility than the one below.” (P2.3-26)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: “The explanation was longer and more
throrough, there were more upvotes. Since I
myself wouldn’t know which is a more prudent
choice, I would defer to collective knowledge
and trust that the people upvoting have tried
the solution and found that it works.” (P2.4-3)
I misunderstand the community mechanisms
Definition: Participant attributes more signifi-
cance to community mechanisms (answer accep-
tance, upvoting) than expected.
Example(s) while selecting a secure solution:
“The green check mark on the left side of the
answer indicated a passed screening or sign of
approval.” (P3.8-1)
“Stack Overflow’s ‘vote up’ feature ensures that
the best and most logical solution (in most cases)
is visually highlighted. The programmer com-
munity can feel confident that the best solution
has been peer reviewed.” (P4.1-9)
Example(s) while selecting an insecure solu-
tion: “It got the check sign, which means it’s the
generally accepted and good answer.” (P3.2-12)
“Most upvotes, i would assume the code in that
answer would work better as more people have
used it” (P2.2-9)
